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RECENT CASES.
CHANGE OF VENUE-INTEREST OF JUDGE-PREJUDICE-AFFIDAVIT-IN-
FORMATION _xD BELIEF-APPEAL-HIGGINS ET AL. V. CITY OF SAN DIEGO
ET AL., 58 Pac. 700 (Cal.).-Water company had claim against city for use
of plant, contingent on sufficient funds in treasury to pay claim, when
accrued. Held, that interest of judge, who was taxpayer, was too remote to
disqualify, though judgment might be foundation of a special tax; and in-
terest being made a special ground of disqualification, cannot be alleged in
support of bias; that (I) a controversy between city and water company, caus-
ing feeling among taxpayers, including judges; (2) a controversy and ex-
change in newspapers of threats between judge and water company; (3)
censure in court of attorney of water company by judge, and resenting of
statements in an affidavit by judge, do not show prejudice sufficient to dis-
qualify the judge. Mere affidavit on information and belief, unattended by
proof, is not sufficient to authorize change of venue.
The Code of Civil Procedure of the State of California contains a pro-
vision, now common in many States, that a judge interested in the litigation
is disqualified from sitting. The present case, while recognizing that in
accordance with American decisions, a judge who is a taxpayer possesses a
definable, pecuniary interest, which will be affected directly by a judgment
in an action for money damages against a city, yet gives new weight
to the distinction which is the essence of the weight of American
authority, his distinction is that if the affection of the pecuniary
interest of the judge is contingent and dependent upon events subsequent
to the rendition of the judgment, that the interest of the judge is too re-
motely involved and too indirectly affected to create a disqualification.
People v. Edmonds, 15 Barb. 531. In the present case the possibility was con-
tingent, and as this supposed interest was alleged as a special ground, it
was not considered in a second count alleging bias. The final clauses of the
decision are well settled law, for in no instance has an affidavit on informa-
tion and belief standing alone been creative of a change of venue. People v.
McCauley, I Cal. 379. Nor has it ever been considered that censure of an
attorney in court or ill feeling toward an attorney by the judge was theoreti-
cally detrimental to the interests of the client. Yet in fact these would con-
stitute a slight bias, and in the present case there was evidence of a most
bitter personal controversy between the water company officials and the
judge previous to his elevation to the bench. The court relies too much
on the innate integrity of a judge. and there seems to be no doubt but that
a great injustice was done in not permitting a change of venue.
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE-STREET WORK-SEcoND ASSESSMENT-
EDE V. CUNEO ET AL., 58 Pac. Rep. 538 (Cal.).-Where it has been provided
by statute, that whenever any suit to foreclose an assessment lien for street
work has been defaulted by reason of some defect in said assessment * "* *
any person interested may within three months after final judgment apply
to the superintendent of streets, and have another assessment issued in con-
formity to law. Held, that superintendent has no authority to make second
assessment for street work when plaintiff's failure to recover on first was
not by any defect in assessment, but by reason of absence of a certificate of
city engineer and of a record thereof.
As the statute is of a remedial nature, it would seem where injustice
would result, that even if the plaintiff were not within the very letter of the
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law, but was within the meaning and object, the statute should be liberally
construed. White v. The Mary Ann, 6 Cal. 462. This position was main-
tained by the two dissenting judges.
CORPORATIONS--ILIABILITY OF DIRECTORS-ENFORCEMENT AT LAW-
AMENDMENT OF COMPLAINT-MARSH V. KAYF ET AL., 6o N. Y. Sup. 43
(Supreme Court).-The membership corporation law, Section ii, makes
directors "jointly and severally" liable for debts contracted while they are
directors, if the action against them to recover the amount unsatisfied
against the corporation be commenced within one year after return of execu-
tion unsatisfied. Held, that the liability is primary, and must be enforced
by an action at law, not in equity, as was attempted in the present case. The
complainant petitioned that the amounts which the directors were liable to
pay might be ascertained and apportioned to the several debts of the plain-
tiff, and of such other creditors as might become entitled to share in the
fruits of the action; and that the defendant creditors of the corporation, and
all other persons claiming to be creditors might be enjoined from prose-
cuting any action at law to recover any debt due from said corporation
and from collecting any judgment in any such action. The court, how-
ever, considered the relation of these directors to a creditor simply that
of joint and several debtors from whom the creditor could recover the
amount of his debt by an action at law, and having a remedy at law, no
cause of action in equity existed which would entitle him to implead all
other creditors with all the debtors who were liable to such creditors
for the amount of their claims against the corporation, for the purpose
of settling the total amount of such indebtedness in one action. "It is no
business of the plaintiff's whether other creditors of the same debtors do
or do riot prosecute their claims, nor have the other creditors any interest
in the recovery by the plaintiff of his claim against his debtors; and nothing
alleged in this complaint would justify the court in restraining these other
defendants from prosecuting their claims at law, as they have a right to do."
McLaughlin, J., dissents on the ground that the avoidance of a multi-
plicity of actions is one of the recognized grounds of equity jurisdiction, and
that no reason can be assigned why equitable jurisdiction ought not to be
sustained to enforce the liability of the directors in the case at bar, to pre-
vent a multiplicity of actions, just as it is sustained in actions against stock-
holders to enforce their statutory liability, but the majority opinion points
out the distinction between the two cases, as follows: "In the case of
limited liability imposed upon stockholders, the Legislature created a fund
which should be applied to the payment of the corporate debts, and it is
apparent that to create and administer that fund, a resort to a court of equity
is essential. In the case at bar no liability is imposed to create a fund for
the benefit of all creditors of the corporation, nor would all creditors be en-
titled to share in the liability imposed upon the directors. but the directors
are made primarily responsible to each creditor of the corporation."
The majority of the court held also that it was not error to refuse to
permit amendment of the dismissal of a complaint to hold trustees of a
defunct corporation liable, the effect of which would be to change the action
to one for an accounting against the receiver, when the original complaint
contains no allegations as to assets in the receiver's hands, and asks no
relief as against him, and does not demand an accounting.
McLaughlin, J., dissented likewise from this opinion on the ground that
the complaint was sufficient to enable the court to direct an accounting even
without amendment. "Before the plaintiff can subject the directors to the
statutory liability," he says, "he must apply towards the payment of the
corporate debts all of the corporate assets. A permanent receiver having
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been appointed, this can only be done by compelling him to account. Until
such accounting be had, and an application be made of the proceeds of the
assets held by the receiver, it is difficult to see how a recovery can be had
against the directors, because until then the extent of their liability cannot
be ascertained."
CORPORATIONS-SALE OF ASSETS BY ALL STOCKHOLDERS WITHOUT
FORMAL AcTION-PURCHASE OF STOCK IN OTHER CORPORATIONS-ULTRA
VIRES-DE LA VERGNE REFRIGERATING M. Co. v. GERMAN SAVINGS INST.
ET AL., 20 -Sup. Ct Rep. 2o.--A contract for purchase of stock in another com-
pany for the purpose of controlling it, unless expressly authorized, is ultra
vires and void. Ultra vires is a good defense to defeat recovery upon an
executed contract, although an action upon quantum meruit will lie for bene-
fits received. The good will of a company belongs to the corporation, and a
transfer of it by all the stockholders without formal corporate action is
invalid and confers no benefit. justices Brewer and McKenna dissenting.
This reverses two decisions of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Eighth District (36 U. S. A. 184, 49 U. S. A. 777). Although the generally
accepted rule seems to be that ultra vires cannot be set up by a corporation
to avoid its obligation upon a contract performed by the other party (Moraw,
§ 689 ff.), it is well established in the Supreme Court that such defense is good.
The doctrine in this court is that "a contract of a corporation which is ultra
vijres in the proper sense, that is to say, outside the object of its creation, as
defined in the law of its organization * * * is wholly void and of no
legal effect." "Nothing done under it, nor the action of the court can infuse
any vitality into it." But the court will do justice, so far as possible, by
permitting recovery on the implied contract to return or make compensa-
tion for property or money which it has no right to retain. Central Transf.
Co. v. Pullman, 139 U. S. 24, 6o-6i.
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES-EJEcTMEvT OF PASSENGER-IMPLIED MALICE-
COWEN ET AL. V. WINTERS, 96 Fed. 929.-A general passenger agent delib-
erately repudiated certain tickets that had been sold to the public. Held, that
a bona fide purchaser of one of these tickets could recover exemplary dam-
ages for his ejectment from defendant's train.
The rule in regard to exemplary damages, as laid down in Railroad Co.
v. Prentice. 147 'U. S. ioI-TO7, is now firmly established and well recognized.
The present case is interesting as a recent exposition of that rule. The
peculiar duties that a common carrier owes to the public makes an abuse of
its civil obligations especially serious. It is this feature, the carrier's close
connection with the public, that permits a court to grant the rather excep-
tional remedy of exemplary damages. The facts in the present case seem
to justify the court in holding as it has. But any extension of rule beyond
the principles laid down in Railroad Co. v. Prentice above, should be viewed
with concern, especially in view of the present apparent hostility to large
corporations.
DEAD BODrES-RIGHT OF WIDOW TO REMOVE HUSBAND'S REMAINS-
6D N. Y. Sup. 539 (Supreme Court).-A widow freely consenting to the
interment of her husband's body in a certain burying ground, is estopped
from removing it. ]But when, at the time of his death, she was in feeble
health and became nearly frantic during the time which preceded the burial,
she should not be regarded as consenting that the place of burial be perma-
nent.
It has long since been established that the right of burial is a legal right.
Foley v. Phelps, I N. Y. App. Div. 551; Pierce v. Swan Point Cemetery, io R- I.
227; 14 Am. Rep. 667; Matter of Widening Beekman St., 4 Bradf. (N. Y.) 503;
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Renihan v. Wright, 125 Ind. 536, and that the surviving husband or wiie, as
the case may be, controls this right rather than the next oi kin. Weld v.
Walker, 130 Mass. 422; Durell v. Hayw'ard, 9 Gray (Mlass.) 248; Larson v.
Chase, 47 Minn. 3o7; Burney v. Children's Hospital, 169 'Mass. 57, 47 N. E.
401.
Though it is well established that after a burial, with the free consent
of the person having the right to control the same, such person is estopped
from removing the remains. Fox v. Gordon, 16 Phila. (Pa.) i85; Peters V.
Peters, 43 N. J. Eq. 140; Thompson v. Deeds, 93 Iowa 228. Yet if the remains
have been buried without such free consent, a court oi equity may permit
such person to remove them. Weld v. Walker, i3o -Mass. 422; Hackett v.
Hackett, i8 R. I. 155, 26 Atl. 42.
HOMESTEAD LIEN-BORROWED MIONEY-CONTRACT-INDEBTED-ESS IX-
CURRED AFTER HOMESTEAD RIGHT ATTAcHEs-JoHNSo. Co" rTY SAVINGS
BAlxK V. CARROLL, 8o N. W. 683 (Iowa).-Where a creditor loans money on
security, which is thereafter lost, he is not entitled to a lien on the homestead
although the money loaned was used to pay part of the purchase price.
Robinson, C. J., dissenting on the ground that same gives to the defend-
ant property which he never paid for, and holds it exempt from liability for
the purchase price actually paid by another.
In Eyster v. Hatheway, 50 I11. 521, and Mitchell v. McCormick., 5o Pac. 216,
it was held that, in order to raise a lien on the homestead, it is not enough
to show that the borrowed money was used to pay for the homestead, but
it must also appear that it was a part of the contract that this should be
done.
In Williams v. Jones, ioo Ill. 362, it was held that, although there be a
waiver of the vendor's lien by taking other security for purchase money
furnished, the holder of the indebtedness will not thereby lose the protec-
tion of the statute which provides that a homestead is not exempt from sale
for a debt or liability incurred for the purchase or improvement thereof.
In Christy v. Dyer, 14 Iowa 438, it was held that a debt for the purchase
money of premises occupied by the debtor as a homestead, is not a debt
arising after the purchase of such homestead; and the homestead may, there-
fore, be subjected to the satisfaction of same.
INJUNcTIoN-LABELS-USE OF PRIVATE NAME -AND LIXKEES--ATIN-
SON V. JOHN: E. DOHERTY & Co., 8o N. W. 285 (Mich.).-Equity will not
restrain the use of the name and likeness of a deceased person as a label to
be used in the sale of cigars named after him, though he may not have been
a public character, so long as it does not amount to a libel.
This case has aroused wide-spread comment throughout the country, as
deciding that there is no law in Michigan against bad taste, and involves a
discussion of the law in regard to the so-called "right to privacy." How
much property right has a person in his name and portrait?
In Schuyler v. Curtis, i9 N. Y. Sup. 264, 64 Hun. 594, the Supreme Court
held that a preliminary injunction would be at the instance of the relatives
of a deceased woman to prevent her statue from being exhibited at the
World's Fair, and designated "The Typical Philanthropist." The case was
afterwards heard and a decree entered in accordance with the prayer of the
bilL Schuyler v. Curtis (Sup. 124 N. Y. Sup. 5og). This decision was squarely
in conflict with the doctrine laid down in present case, but was reversed by
the Court of Appeals in i895. See 42 N. E. 22, Gray, J., dissenting, the
opinion holding that "a woman's right of privacy, in so far as it includes the
right to prevent the public from making pictures and statues of her, does
not survive her, so that it can be enforced by her relatives." In Marks v.
Jaffa, 26 N. Y. Sup. go8, publication of portrait was enjoined apparently
on the strength of Schuyler v. Curtis, not then reversed.
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Corliss v. Walker, 31 Lawy. Rep. Ann. 283, and note (S. C. 57 Fed. 434,
and 64 Fed. 28o), denied an injunction to restrain the publication of a biog-
raphy of the great inventor, but granted it to restrain the publication of his
portrait. Subsequently this injunction was dissolved, on the ground that the
deceased was a public character, not a private individual. In the case under
discussion the court in commenting on the Corliss case questions the wis-
dom of the distinction, and says: "We are loath to believe that the man
who makes himself useful to mankind surrenders any right of privacy
thereby."
In Murray v. Engraving Co., 28 N. Y. Sup. 27I, it was held that a father
could not prevent the unauthorized publication of his child's photograph,
for the law takes no cognizance of a sentimental injury independent of a
wrong to person or property.
There are many authorities to the effect that a private individual has a
right to be protected in the representation of his portrait in any form, and
that this is a property as well as a personal right. Cf. Gee v. Pritchard, 2
Swanst. 402; Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story ioo, Fed. Cas. No. 49oi; Tipping v.
Clarke, 2 Hare 383, 393; Prince Albert v. Strange, I Mach and G. 25. But the
court in the present case decides that the alleged right to privacy is not
under this particular state of facts a property right, and that so long as the
publication of the portrait does not amount to a libel, a court of equity will
not protect the relatives of the deceased against a mere injury to their feel-
ings, although a violation of the canons of good taste. "The law," says the
court, "does not discriminate between persons who are sensitive and those
who are not."
INSOLVENT CORPORATIONS--SECRET PREFERENCE OF CREDITORS-
UNITED STATES RUEBER Co. ET AL. V. AMERICAN OAR LEATHER Co., 96 Fed.
84i.-Where a corporation that is about to fail, in order to gain time and
borrow money, makes an arrangement with some of its creditors whereby
they are to be put in charge of the concern and be given judgment notes
covering what is due them and thereby are to prevent preferences to other
creditors, such an arrangement is a fraud in fact on the general creditors.
Courts have recognized the justice of allowing embarrassed concerns to
tide over difficulties by using their property in any way they may see fit.
Pieston v. Spaulding, 125 Ill. 2o; White v. Cotzhausen, 129 U. S. 329. But
they have further recognized that one cannot convey all his property and
stop doing business. Kelloy v. Richardson, I9 Fed. 70, 72. It then becomes
a question of what was the intention of the insolvent concern in entering
into obligations like those in the present case. How close a question this
often is, is well illustrated by the- case before us. We see how frequently
the judicial mind may differ on this point, and in view of the large interests
that may be concerned in such case, how imllortant it is that a transaction
should be considered as actually fraudulent only on the strongest proof or
actual knowledge. Street v. Bank, 147 U. S. 36.
INSURANCE-AGENT-AuTHoRITY - NOTICE - PoLicy - ENDORSEMENT
-WARRANTY-NORTHRUP LT AL. V. PiZA, 6o N. Y. Supp. 363-A fire insur-
ance policy was issued by general agents and attorneys of a fire insurance
company on recommendation of a firm of fire insurance brokers, said policy
containing material warranty on the part of the insured. Subsequently an
addition was made to the policy in which no mention was made of the war-
ranty. Held, that a broker having only authority to solicit risks, recommend
same, and receive premiums (these services being paid for by commissions),
is not an agent of the insuring company, and hence notice to him is not
notice to the company. Also that attachment of said endorsement, see
supra, did not abrogate original warranty clause.
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The defense in the original action rested on the ground that no notice
had been given of the falsity of a material warranty in the original policy
as to the existence of certain division walls, and that the waiver of the war-
ranty by the insurance brokers was ultra vires. Particular importance is
given to the prevailing doctrine that insurance brokers are not agents, the
leading case mentioned being Allen v. Insurance Co., 123 N. Y. 6. The many
cases contra are not now considered of authority. The court argues that
the endorsement, containing no mention of the warranty, but reiterating the
original policy in other respects, and subsequently added to the policy,
was not a waiver, because not conflicting with original form of policy.
It is clear that this is not the real reason, for the endorsement did
not act as a waiver, because it was added (according to the evidence)
by the brokers, who were not agents, and therefore had no authority to
waive a warranty. The dissenting opinion is a most thorough demonstra-
tion of the possibility of waiver by such an endorsement, but does not even
allude to the possible lack of authority on part of the brokers. This disre-
gard of the vital question makes the dissenting opinion of no weight what-
ever. The brokers were not agents, had no authority to waive conditions,
and notice to them was not notice to the company or its agents. Smith v.
Farmers' Mut. F. Ins. Co., ig Ohio St. 287; Devens v. Mechanics, etc., Ins. Co.,
83 N. Y. 168.
MUNIcIPAL BONDs--DEMAND-PRIORITIES-MEYER V. WIDBER, Tan.4s-
URE. (Bohen, Intervener), 58 Pac. Rep. 532 (Cal.).-Held, that where under
statute damages to abutting property owners are to be paid only in bonds, it
is no defense to a mandamus compelling payment of a bond, that other bond-
holders had made prior demands, which had been refused for lack of funds.
Beatty, C. J., Temple, J., and Henshaw, J., dissenting.
The decision of the court is without doubt correct. The demand upon
the treasurer, when he had funds applicable for the purpose, gives the parties
demanding, upon refusal of their demand, the right to a mandamus. Meyer
v. Porter, 65 Cal. 67. The fact that the intervener neglected to follow up his
demand by an action would not give him a preferred claim over one who
made a subsequent demand and chose to enforce his right. It has been held
that a judgment creditor of a county who had received a warrant on the
treasurer, which was refused payment, might have mandamus to enforce
collection of a tax to pay such judgment, and that he is not bound to wait
and take his turn among other warrant holders. 2 Cent. Law Journal 77I.
The chief justice, who dissents, contends that the intervener should be
given priority in payment, for, having made a prior demand, the treasurer
was legally obliged to make payment, unless the intervener had forfeited his
rights. Furthermore, that it was the duty of the appellant to show that when
be commenced his proceeding, that those who had made prior demands had
lost their right of action. This the appellant failed to do. The contention
is also made that if the doctrine of this case is carried to its logical conclu-
sion, the custodian of a fund in the position of the defendant may pay or
refuse those who make demands, irrespectively, unless sued, or he may
refuse all until some favored claimant serves him with a writ of mandamus.
The judge, however, fails to cite any authorities in support of this reason-
ing.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-ORDINANcES--HACK STANDS IN STREETS
ADJACENT TO R-AILW-AY DEPOTS-PENNSYLVANIA Co. v. CHICAGO, s4 N. F_
825.-The Union Depot, leased by the Pennsylvania Company and used by
several different railways, fronts on Canal street, between Madison and Van
Buren. All through tickets of lines using this depot bear coupons for con-
veyance through the city of Chicago from this station to the station of the
connecting line, and each railway company has a contract for the use of a
line of coaches for the performance of this service. A portion of the rail-
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roads' own ground is used by the vehicles of this line of coaches, from
whence they may be called by electric bells to the different exits from the
depot. The city of Chicago by ordinance established the east side of Canal
street, between Adams and Madison, as a place where hacks were permitted
to stand. The Railway Company brought a bill, praying for an injunction
restraining the city from continuing the stand for hacks, on the ground of
irreparable injury by reason of interference, interruption and daily incon-
venience to the complainants, amounting to an interference with their private
rights, and causing an unjust burden upon their property without compensa-
tion. And, further, that it gives for private use a portion of Canal street,
which is held by the city in trust solely for use as a public street. Held, the
ordinance is a reasonable and valid exercise of the powers conferred upon
the Common Council of the city of Chicago. Decree of lower court dis-
missing bill affirmed.
The doctrine of the court is that a railroad is a quasi-public corpora-
tion, and a railroad depot a public building. The special easement of the
abutting owner in the case of a building used for public purposes, though
privately owned, inheres in the city as trustee for the public. That it may,
as a benefit to the public, and to prevent the railroad company from monop-
olizing the business of transfer, permit hack stands at such places. Cf. Rail-
road Co. v. Langlois, 9 Mont. 419; Railroad v. Tripp, i47 Mass. 43; Marriott
v. Railway, I C. B. (N. S.) 499; McConnell v. Pedigo, 92 Ky. 465; State v.
Reed, 24 Lou. 3o8 (Miss.).
Cartwright, C. J., dissents. The occupation of a street as a place for the
owners of hacks, carriages, and express wagons to keep them while waiting
for employment in the carriage of persons or property, is a purely private
use. It is of the same nature as the occupation of premises as a stable yard.
Rex v. Cross, 3 Camp. 224; Branahan v. Hotel Co., 39 Ohio St. 333; McCaffrey
v. Smith, 41 Hun. 117. Such a use is a perversion and violation of the trust
on which the city holds the streets. 2 Dill. Mun. Corp. § 66o; Com. v. Pass-
more, i Serg. and Rawle 217; Lockwood v. Railroad Co., 122. Mo. 86. Injunc-
tion is a proper remedy. High Injunctions, 3d Ed. § 816; Hill. In., 273;
Greene v. Oakes, I7 Ill. 249.
MUNICIPAL CoRPoRATioNS----RIPARL.A OWNERs---POLLUTION OF WATER
COURSES BY SEWAGE-INJUNCTION-CITY OF VALPARAISO V. HAGEN, 54 N.
E. io62 (Ind.).-The sewage system of Valparaiso, a city of 8,ooo inhabitants,
discharges 47,000 gallons of sewage daily into a marsh that drains into Salt
Creek. The city further arranged for a direct outlet by the extension of its
main sewer through the marsh to Salt Creek. Ninteen owners of lower
lands abutting on this stream brought a bill praying that the city be enjoined
forever from constructing said sewer outlet, or emptying the sewage of the
city into said stream. Upon error for demurrer, overruled, held, failure to
aver the absence of skill or want of due care, or that some other outlet
could more reasonably be had, or that some other reasonable method of
disposing of city sewage is available, is a fatal defect and the demurrer
should be sustained.
The right of the riparian owner is not absolute, but a natural one, quali-
fied and limited'like all natural rights by the existence of like rights in others.
His enjoyment is prior to those below him and subsequent to those above.
Merrield v. Worcester, 11o Mass. 218. The city of Valparaiso is an upper
riparian owner. As such it has rights to the use of Salt Creek, though these
rights are correlative with those of other riparian owners on the same stream.
Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N. H. 569. Any damage resulting from
acts of the city in a reasonable exercise of these rights would be damnum
absque injuria. It must be presumed that public officers will perform their
duties reasonably and with due care, therefore, injunction will not lie.
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PARTNERSHIP-CONTINUANCE OF BUSINESS WITH CONSENT OF EXECU-
TRIX-WEHAT IS FIRM PROPERTY-REAL ESTATE-DEXTER V. DEXTER ET AL..
6o N. Y. Sup. 371.-Father and son were co-partners in business and tenants
in common in certain real estate. On the death of father, said son and a sec-
ond son became co-partners in same business, each making certain convey-
ances oi real estate to the other, in order to equalize their partnership inter-
ests and their separate interests in real estate left by their father. First son
died, and, with consent of his executrix, the survivor carried on business until
failure took place. Held, death of partner ends partnership and power to
carry on partnership business; sanction of continuance of business by execu-
trix of deceased partner renders said executrix a creditor of surviving part-
ner of equal grade with other creditors, to the amount of the value of what-
ever interest in firm that is lost by him; real estate inherited by co-partners
is not firm property, if merely occupied and not otherwise used.
The prevailing opinion holds that in the absence of express provisions
in will of deceased partner, or in articles of partnership, the partnership is
dissolved, and that if surviving partner continues business with consent of
executrix of deceased partner, he does so as an individual, and all debts con-
tracted by him in the conduct of the business or by the borrowing of money
are due from him as an individual, for reason that he conducts the business
as an individual, as a surviving partner, in whom the entire title to the part-
nership property is vested. There seem to be several faults in this reason-
ing. First, it is generally considered that a business may be continued with
consent of representatives of deceased partner, and even if in line with some
decisions, a business so continued is considered a new partnership (Par-
sons on Partnership, Sect. 343), the liability of the surviving partner is not
individual, but is that of a co-partner. Secondly, the title of a surviving
partner is complete only for purpose of liquidating the affairs of the firm.
The doctrine of the dissenting opinion seems the better one. that the claim
of the executrix and devisee of the deceased partner was subordinated to the
claims of the creditors of the continued business. and that an individual
creditor would be subordinated to both executrix and creditors of continued
business. A curious statement exists at the close of the prevailing opinion, to
the effect that an individual creditor of the surviving partner would take pre-
cedence of the rights of the receiver. This is without any support of princi-
ple or authority. Because certain land was merely occupied by co-partner-
ship, but not otherwise used, and not purchased with partnership assets, it
was held not to be partnership property. The best rule is dearly this: that
land improvements and taxes upon which were paid out of partnership
assets, and which was regarded as firm property, is firm property. Fairchild
v. Fairchild, 64 N. Y. 471; Ross v. Eldred, 73 Cal. 394.
PERSOX.AL INJURIES-ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TEsTirnoxy-Cxousn
1% CHICAGO & N. W. Ry. Co., 8o N. W. 752 (Wis.).-In an action for per-
sonal injuries, held, that it is error to permit testimony that the plaintiff
would require medical attention in the future and to what extent. Dodge
and Winslow, JJ., dissenting.
The advancement of the sciences and the progress of research in special
fields of knowledge have made expert testimony of large importance during
the present century. The basis of its admission is the fact that there are
certain processes of reasoning which an ordinary jury is incapable of per-
forming, even .with the assistance of courts and juries. Hence, the general
rule is that experts may give their opinions upon questions of science, skill,
or trade, or others of the like kind, or when the subject matter of injury
is such that unexperienced persons are unlikely to prove capable of forming
a correct Judgment upon it without such assistance, or when it so far par-
takes of the nature of a science as to require a course of previous habit or
study, in order to the attainment of a knowledge of it; and the opinion of
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experts are not admissible when the inquiry is into the subject matter, the
nature of which is not such as to require any peculiar habits or study in
order to qualify a man to understand it. Jones v. Tucker, 41 N. H. 546; New
England Glass Co. v. Lowell, 7 Cush. 31g; Graham v. Pans Co., 139 Pa. St.
'49.
In the present case the doctor was allowed to testify that the plaintiff
was rendered a helpless paralytic by the injury and that such condition is
likely to be permanent. This seems to be in accordance with the general
rule, that an expert can testify as to the effect, nature, and extent of personal
injuries, and what are the probable resuits that would follow from an injury.
Albert v. N. Y. L. E. TV. R. Co., 118 N. Y. 77; Fiber v. N. Y. Central R. Co.,
49 N. Y. 42; Rowell v. City of Lowell, ii Gray, 420; Evansville & T. H. R.
Co. v. Crest, 116 Ind. 446; Louisville N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Wood, 113 Ind. 54.
In Fiber v. New York Central R. R. Co., Allen, J., in the opinion of the
court says there is no evidence other than that of experts by which courts
and juries can determine whether a disease or an injury has been or can be
permanently cured or what its effect will be upon the health and capability
of the injured person in the future.
In Albert v. N. Y. L. E. W. R. Co., the witness was asked to state length
of time plaintiff might live in the natural course of events, and it was held
to be no error.
Thus it would seem to follow as a natural consequence that testimony
that plaintiff would require medical attention and nursing in the future, and
to what extent, would be admissible, but the court excluded it upon the some-
what inconceivable ground that such evidence entered the domain of common
knowledge, and that the jury were as able to arrive at that conclusion without
the aid of his opinion as with it. In the course of the opinion of the court,
Bardeem, J., remarks: "There are experts and experts, and many of them
testify like retained witnesses, and that very much of such testimony is of
little more value than an intelligent guess," but we are unable to see how
that which simply affects the credibility of a witness can bar the admissibility
of his testimony. The rules affecting credibility of witnesses and admissi-
bility of evidence are separate and distinct.
One of the objections to the admissibility of the testimony is, says the
learned judge, that its tendency was to increase the damages and swell a
recovery. But what could be more reasonable for to quote from a prior part
of the opinion, "it is sufficient if the damage claimed legitimately flows
'directly from the negligent act, whether such damage might be foreseen by
,the wrong doer or not."
In a dissenting opinion, Dodge, J., says that while "the testimony may
approach the field of common knowledge, from which expert testimony
should be carefully excluded, it does not prejudically cross the line." The
present case was one of severe spinal injury and disordered nervous system,
with which the ordinary juror is strangely unfamiliar, and in which the opin-
ion of a physician would be very valuable, while a non-professional would
be totally at sea. In short, the testimony in reality did not invade the ground
of common knowledge, but merely invoked the peculiar knowledge and
opinion of a medical expert, and for this reason should have been held
admissible.
PUBLIc LANDS--.MExICAN GRA.TS-RIGHTS OF INDIANs-HARVEY ET
AL. v. BAREx ET AL., s8 Pac. Rep. 692 (Cal.).-Defendants, Mission Indians,
claimed a prescriptive title to certain lands included within the boundaries
of a Mexican grant, which grant was confirmed by the United States and a
patent thereto issued to plaintiff's grantor. Defendants did not present their
claim to the land commissioners for confirmation, as provided under Act
Cong., March 3, 185r. Plaintiff took the land subject to the condition that
he should not interfere with roads, cross roads and other usages (servi-.
dumbres). Held, that said grant was not subject to any right or interest
in the defendants, and that no trust relation existed between the grantor and
defendants.
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The decision is by an evenly divided court. The dissenting judges seemto adopt the better line of reasoning, which is borne out by a long line ofdecisions. Teschemacher et al. v. Thompson ef al., 18 Cal. ii. When Mexicogained her independence it was declared that all inhabitants, including Indi-ans, should be considered citizens, and that the property of every citizenshould be respected and protected. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Mexicanswho, previous to the acquisition of California by the United States, hadacquired title to lands from that government, and who chose to remain, heldsuch title and were protected the same as if no change in sovereignty had
occurred. Phelan et al. v. Poyoreno et al., 74 Cal. 448.The defendants relied upon Byrne v. Alas, 74 Cal. 628, which is an almost
parallel case. Here, as in the case under consideration, the appellants failedto present their claim to the land commissioners. The court held that itwas not necessary, and that they were not even charged with knowing that
there was such a commission.
C. J., Beatty, who dissented, pointed out that the only difference in thecase under review and Byrne v. A/as was that there was no provision quoted,that the plaintiff took the land subject that he should in no way disturb normolest the Indians who were living thereon. But he calls attention to thefact that the plaintiff should not interfere with roads or other "servidumbres,"
and that the word "servidumbres" had a meaning in Spanish law broadenough to include the right of occupancy claimed'by the defendants.
In addition to the above, another of the dissenting judges contendedthat the defendants would still have had the right to occupy the land hadthere been no express reservation, for the Indians being mere wards of thenation, it is to be presumed that the nation has always recognized and pro-tected their customary rights, and that all grants are made with the under-standing that grantees know those rights, and take subject to them.
RAILROADS-INJURY TO ADJOINING LAND--SYRAcusE SOLAR-SALT Co.
v. ROmE, V r. & 0. R. R. Co., 6o N. Y. Sup. 4o.-Where a railroad company
operated under statute and municipal license its track upon a city street, and
thereby cart such dirt, cinders and soot upon the plaintiff's premises adjoin-
ing, as to cause him great damage in the prosecution of his business, the
manufacture of salt, diminishing its quantity, quality and value. Held, that
the plaintiff was entitled to compensation.
The defendant in this case relied, with apparent reason, on the case ofForbes v. Railroad Co.. 12r N. Y. 505. It was held in that case that a railroadoperating its road under proper authority upon a city street, took no adjoin-ing property and was not liable to the owner of such property for any con-sequential damages resulting from a natural use of the road for railroad
purposes.
But that decision is now limited by this case, the court saying that itis a "very broad statement of the rule and must be taken with some qualifica-
tion."
The Legislature may authorize a small nuisance, but where it greatly
exceeds the nature of an inconvenience and causes great damage, compensa-
tion must be allowed.
The court holds that this case presents the fact of a taking of plaintiff's
property, because proprietary rights must be considered here as valuableproperty. Arimord v. Green Bay, etc., Co., 31 Wis. 316, 335. Such use is aneasement on the plantiffs property. 2 Washburn on Real Proper y, 4th Ed..99; Long Island R. R. Co. v. Garvey, 159 N. Y. 33&
SALE OF LiQUOR BY DRuGGmT - TowN O INANcz - PzoPLE V.
BR.AxsT=, 58 Pac. Rep. 796 (Colo.).-A town attorney furnished a person
with money to purchase liquor from a druggist who had no permit. By
such a sale the druggist would violate a town ordinance. Held, that the
town could not recover a penalty for a violation of its ordinance instigated
and procured by, its officer.
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Although there are few cases involving this principle, the decision seems
to be correct. It was held, in Love v. People, i6o Ill. Soi, where a detective
by a previously arranged plan with the owner of a building induced certain
persons to enter the building and take money from a safe, with the sole
intent of entrapping them, that they could not be convicted of crime. In his
opinion on the case under consideration, the judge relies on Ford v. City of
Denver, io Colo. App. 5oo, where it was held public policy will not permit
a municipality to derive profit from unlawful acts which are deliberately
instigated by its officers. To hold that a town attorney can involve a person
in a violation of an ordinance, that he may pursue him for a penalty would
seem a most pernicious doctrine.
STATE APPROPRIATION TO NORMAL UNIVERSITY-CONSTITUTIONALITY-
BOEHM V. HERTZ, 54 N. E. 973 (Illinois).-The Constitution of Illinois pro-
vides: "The State shall never pay, assume or become responsible for the
debts or liabilities of, or in any manner give, loan or extend its credit to or
in aid of, any public or other corporation, association or individuaL" The
Legislature passed an act making an appropriation "for the ordinary and
other expenses of Illinois State Normal University and for the completion
and equipment of its gymnasium building." One Boehm, a taxpayer,
brought a bill praying for an injunction restraining Hertz, the State treas-
urer, from paying any money appropriated under the act. Held, act constitu-
tional, bill dismissed.
The corporation was in existence prior to the adoption of the Constitu-
tion and had received the interest of a fund called the College and University
Fund, provided for in the act for the admission of the territory of Illinois
as a State. Any subsequent limitation of its powers to do so must be found
expressed or arising by necessary implication in the Constitution. They
are not so found, and the corporation may receive. May the State give?
The Constitution also provides that "The General Assembly shall provide a
thorough and efficient system of free schools." There is no limitation in the
Constitution as to the agencies the State shall adopt in providing this system
of free schools. Speight v. People, 87 111. 6oo. Normal schools are public
institutions which the State has a right to establish and maintain for the
purpose of carrying out the policy of the State with reference to free schools.
Burr v. City of Carbondale, 76 Ill. 455.
SET OFF-JUDGMENT-GRouNDS OF OBJEcTIoN-BACON V. REICH, 80
N. W. 278 (Mich.).-One being sued on a contract which he made with a
corporation, since insolvent, by one to whom the corporation had assigned
the claim, can set off a judgment obtained by him against the corporation,
for a breach of the contract, in proceedings instituted by him subsequent to
the assignment by the corporation of the claim against h'm, where he had
no knowledge of the assignment when he took his judgment.
That a claim becomes merged in the judgment is elementary. Accord-
ing to the more recent cases this principle is supported on the grounds that
the allowance of a new suit is a superfluous and vexatious encouragement
to litigation. injurious to the defendant, and of no benefit to the plaintiff.
I5 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 339, and cases cited. This doctrine, however, if
vigorously applied, may work hardship and injustice, and it seems to be
lawful to disregard it in some cases. Wilson v. Tunstall, 6 Tex. 221; Wood
v. Gamble, ii Cush. 8; Railroad Company v. McHenry, 17 Fed. 4T4; Ferrall v.
Bradford, 2 Fla. 5o8; Clark v. Rowling, 3 N. Y. 216; Stevens v. Damon, 29 Vt.
521; Cramer v. Manufacturing Co., 93 Fed. 636; Fox v. Althorp, 40 Ohio
St. 32.
STjRET RAILWAY-LIcENsE-REcEivERs-IMPROVEMENT OF MORTGAGED
PRoPERTY-RocEESTER TRUST AND SAFE DEPOSIT Co. v. ROCHaESTER AND
I. R. Co. ET AL., 6D N. Y. Sup. 409 (Supreme Ct.).-An electric railway
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passed under the right of way of a steam railroad, under an agreement that
on sixty-days' notice it would erect permanent undercrossings of substantial
masonry. After the electric road had passed into the hands of a receiver, the
railroad served the sixty-days' notice. The court held that the permission
to cross the right of way was a mere license which the railroad could revoke
at any time, and, since the railroad had not been made a party, the court
would not authorize the receiver to issue certificates to erect the permanent
improvements, but would leave the purchaser at the receiver's Sale to assume
the responsibility of making them.
Two important questions are here discussed. The court decided that the
electric road had a mere license, and no easement in the property of the
steam railroad, since no grant had been made by deed, without which no
easement can exist. Cf. White v. Railway Co., 139 N. Y. 24, 34 N. B. 887.
This being so, would the construction by the electric railway company of the
permanent undercrossings create an equitable estoppel which would operate
to prevent a revocation of the license, on the ground that the licensee had
entered upon the land of the licensor and expended thereon labor and money
upon the faith of the license? The court deemed it unnecessary to answer
this question, since the steam railroad had not been made a party to the
action and would not be bound by any decision affecting its rights in the
undercrossings, but cited with apparent approval White v. Railroad Co., supra,
which decided that no equitable estoppel would arise under such circum-
stances, "because it must be held that the licensee knew that the license
gave him no interest in the land, and that he must rely upon the indulgence
of the licenser, and if that be withdrawn, he must himself withdraw from
the land; otherwise, it is said, the statute in regard to the creation and con-
veyance of interests in land would be in great part abrogated."
The second question discussed is the right of a receiver to issue certifi-
cates in payment for permanent improvements to the road, thus creating a
lien on the property prior to that of the mortgagees. The court held that
the purpose for which receiver's certificates may be issued is usually confined
to making necessary repairs and protecting the property as it is. The propriety
of every expenditure is to be judged by the necessity of making it in order
to preserve the value of the property in the hands of the receiver. The gen-
erally recognized rule is that the original construction creditors have no
superior equity. In Wood v. Deposit Co., 128 0. S. 416. 9 Sup. Ct. 131, it
was held that the doctrine of Fosdick v. Schall, 99 0. S. 235. applied to
operating expenses'only, and not to a contract in the ordinary construction of'the
road. Applying these doctrines to the case at bar, the court decides "that
it has no power to impair the obligations of a mortgage contract by creating
a prior lien, without the mortgagee's consent, unless it be in the exercise
of an equitable power to preserve and protect the property, and that it has
no power through its receiver to complete unfinished work or to erect new
bridges or undercrossings under a pre-existing contract, beyond what is
necessary for the preservation of the property of the corporation."
TRA Es UNiONs-REFUSAL TO WORK WITH MEMBERS OF OIrxnR UNIONS
-REFOR-M CLUB OF M.ASONS AND PLASTERERS, KNIGHTS OF LABOR OF CITY
OF NEW YORK ET AL. v. LABORERS' UNION PROTECTIVE SOc-ETy ET AL., 6o
N. Y. Sup. 388 (Supreme Court, Special Term, New York County).-
Motion to continue a preliminary injunction obtained against defendants, on
the ground that the defendant's members refused to work with members of
the plaintiff association, under circumstances where the natural effect of the
expressed refusal would be to cause the dismissal of the latter class.
The court denied the motion and vacated the preliminary injunction,
holding that such refusal of the defendants did not amount to a conspiracy
to prevent an employment of the plaintiffs under all circumstances, and in the
absence of instances of intimidation or of false statements as to the charac-
ter of the laborers affected, the case disclosed nothing unlawful In the atti-
tude of the defendants.
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The court seems to infer that had the facts disclosed a conspiracy to
prevent an employment of the plaintiffs under all circumstances, a permanent
injunction would have been granted. Yet, if the defendants had sought to
prevent all employment of plaintiffs, but had done nothing else to accom-
plish this purpose except refusing to work with them and inducing other
workmen to likewise refuse, it is hard to see how this would have been an
unlawful conspiracy. Certainly it would not if the leading English authori-
ties are to be followed, for Mogul S. S. Co. v. McGregor, L. R., 1892, App.
Cases 25, decides that the mere fact of combination does not make an act
unlawful, and Allen v. Flood, L. R., 1898, App. Case i, holds that a malicious
purpose does not make an act unlawful, if the act in itself be legal. The act
of refusing to work with other men is perfectly lawful in itself, even though
there be behind it the malicious intent to prevent all employment whatsoever.
It is persecution, but persecution by lawful means, which cannot be reached
at law, according to the English doctrine, unless the unlawful element of
intimidation appear.
In this case the plaintiffs asserted that intimidation could be inferred
from the disnissal, and cited Coons v. Chrystie, 53 N. Y. Sup. 668, to support
them, but the court held that case to have no application to the present
facts. "In that case the suit was by the employer of laborers, whose business
was damaged by the defendant union's acts in prohibiting its members from
continuing their work; and it was held that the coercion of the -laborers by the
union was apparent and .sufficnt to sustain an action by the employer. In
the case at bar, the willingness of defendant's members to obey its orders is not
placed in question, and the effect of the defendant's acts upon the employers
of the members of plaintiff association does not amount to unlawful coercion
under the authorities.
For an extension of the doctrine of intimidation, see Boutwell v. Marr,
42 Atlan. Rep. 6o7 (Vt), which holds that any association which obtains
unanimous consent from its members to its action by means of a coercive
penalty or by-law. is founded upon coercion, and that the united action of
the association obtained by this coercive means is equivalent to actual in-
timidation employed by an unorganized body of men. An application of
this doctrine to labor unions, some of which certainly make use of such a
coercive penalty to obtain unanimity, might well supply the element of
intimidation not apparent on the face of such proceedings as those discussed
in this case.
